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Abstract
I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation,
replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships.  Changes over time in the value
of equity compensation create considerable variation in director pay.  Board members of the
most successful firms earn millions of dollars within their first five years, a marked change in the
historical pattern of rewards for directors.  I also find statistically significant evidence that
outside directors’ replacement and total board seats held are associated generally with company
performance.  Previous research had only shown these relations to apply under extreme
circumstances such as financial distress.
I appreciate helpful comments from Jay Hartzell and Anil Shivdasani.
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1. Introduction
What causes outside directors to monitor managers, rather than collude with them?  Fama
and Jensen (1983) posit the existence of a market for outside directors’ services, conjecturing
that, “Our hypothesis is that outside directors have incentives to develop reputations as experts in
decision control. . . They use their directorships to signal to internal and external markets for
decision agents that they are experts. . . The signals are credible when the direct payments to
outside directors are small, but there is substantial devaluation of human capital when internal
decision control breaks down. . .”
To date most studies of the market for outside directors have focused on directors’
success in accumulating seats on additional boards, finding some evidence that fewer offers for
new directorships occur for the board members of firms that perform poorly.  However, very
little research into outside directors has examined the most direct incentives – compensation and
replacement – that form the backbone of rewards for company executives.  Exceptions such as
Gilson (1988) and Harford (2001) tend to focus on extreme circumstances such as financial
distress or hostile takeovers.  For the vast majority of firms that do not face these crises, we have
little evidence that outside directors face significant performance incentives.
2This paper investigates the range of incentives received by outside directors, studying a
panel of 734 directors elected to the boards of Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 1996.  I
follow each director for five years after election, tracking compensation received, appreciation of
equity compensation, other board seats obtained, changes in disclosed conflicts of interest, and
departures from the board.  All of these variables represent potential sources of motivation or
discipline for an individual director.  Studying how director incentives evolve over time seems
especially important, because most new outside directors arrive at their firms with close to zero
equity, little direct knowledge of the company’s operations, and their reputations dependent
almost entirely on their current or former full-time jobs.  As time passes these relations change,
as directors accumulate equity in the firm and are more likely to influence – and be rewarded for
– the company’s strategy and performance.
I find statistically significant evidence that outside directors receive positive performance
incentives from compensation, turnover, and opportunities to obtain new board seats.  The
results apply to a broad cross-section of firms in all performance ranges, not just those with
extreme performance that have been the focus of prior research.  Rewards from compensation
appear to have much more economic significance that those from opportunities to obtain other
board seats or the threat of removal.  For directors of the best performing firms, financial
rewards can be extremely large, growing into millions of dollars over the directors’ first several
years.  These findings represent something of a contrast to the idealized market for directors’
services envisioned by Fama and Jensen, who hypothesized that the market works best when
“payments to outside directors are small” relative to the after-market incentives related to the
directors’ reputations.
3One reason that director compensation and replacement may have received little attention
in past research is that both of these incentive mechanisms are subject to severe conflicts of
interest, as the board generally sets its own compensation and, in the absence of a rare proxy
fight, decides on its own members’ continuation in office.  However, external forces in recent
years have constrained boards’ ability to overpay or entrench themselves with impunity. 
Institutional investors have promulgated standards for corporate governance and attempted to
enforce them through a mix of direct meetings, shareholder resolutions, and media campaigns
against companies that they target for poor governance.  In noteworthy cases such as Archer
Daniels Midland, American Express, W.R. Grace and Walt Disney, these types of pressure have
led directly to replacement of certain outside directors and/or changes in the structure of board
compensation.  Other firms with suboptimal governance have no doubt taken note of these
examples and acted likewise.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the
sample and data collection.  Section 3 presents analysis of four incentive mechanisms for outside
directors: compensation, losing their board seats, obtaining additional directorships in other
firms, and the possibility of obtaining special treatment from the company that would “corrupt”
an independent outside director by converting him or her to “grey” or “affiliated” status.  Section
4 concludes the paper.
2. Data description
Data for this study is based on the panel of director appointments examined in Shivdasani
and Yermack (1999).  That paper included 766 outside director appointments in Fortune 500
4firms announced in proxy statements between 1994 and 1996, excluding firms in the financial
and electric utility industries, which tend to have larger boards dominated by local business
executives.  Outside directors are classified according to the standard taxonomy of
“independent” and “grey,” with the latter category including those with disclosed conflicts of
interest.  These conflicts include special consulting contracts for the director, a significant
business relationship between the firm and the director’s main employer, a family relationship
between the director and a top manager, and interlocking board memberships between the
director and the CEO.  I drop 29 observations from the original sample for directors who joined
boards of sample companies due to acquisitions, since these directors were not “new” to their
positions and can be expected to have accumulated ownership and power within the board
greater than a rookie director appointed from outside.  An additional four observations were
reclassified from grey to inside and also dropped, and one new observation missed in the original
data collection was added to the sample.  The sample for this paper therefore includes 734 new
outside directors, 607 independent and 127 grey.  These 734 appointments involve 684
individual people (39 persons are appointed to two boards, four persons join three boards, and
one person joins four).  In seven cases, outside directors become officers of the company at some
point after joining the board.  These directors all remain on the board as insiders, but because I
am interested in incentives faced by outside directors, I stop tracking these directors at the point
at which they move inside.
I gather data about directors by reading their biographies in the first five proxy statements
published by the firm in which they appear.  Twenty-eight percent of the directors do not survive
in office for at least five years, leaving due to retirement from the board (16 percent), de-listing
5of the company (11 percent), and, as mentioned above, a change in status from outside to inside
(1 percent).  Slightly more than one-fifth of new directors are women and most own virtually no
stock when appointed, with a median ownership position of 0.0004 percent of shares
outstanding.
I gather from proxy statements annual observations for each director about compensation
received, board seats held in other firms, stock owned, committee memberships, and disclosed
conflicts of interest involving the company or one of its top managers.  A large number of
directors join their boards by appointment rather than shareholder election midway through the
year before they first appear in a proxy statement.  In these cases it can be difficult to ascertain
whether they received partial or complete directors’ fees; I generally assume that they have
received the full fee unless specific disclosure or data about the director’s stock ownership
indicate otherwise; especially in the case of equity compensation, most firms appear to report
carefully when a director receives less than the entire year’s standard fee.  Many boards that
award equity compensation make very large awards to new directors in order to give them a
critical mass of ownership in the firm, so it is important not to overlook compensation received
during this first year or part-year on the board.
Directors receive compensation in the form of both shares of stock and stock options,
sometimes simultaneously.  Most company disclosures for this equity pay are much briefer for
directors than for executives, so I generally do not know basic terms of these awards such as the
date, the stock price when awarded, or terms such as vesting or restrictions on sale.  I therefore
make a range of assumptions for use in valuing equity compensation and its subsequent
appreciation.  I assume that equity pay is awarded when the stock price equals the average price
6for the year, computed from the twelve monthly closing stock prices.  All stock options are
assumed to be awarded at-the-money with ten year lives, in line with the overwhelmingly
prevailing practice.  When firms give directors the opportunity to choose between cash and
equity compensation, or deferral of cash compensation into an equity-based instrument, I assume
that they choose the maximum amount of cash pay permitted unless disclosure indicates
otherwise.  This assumption assures that subsequent calculations about the importance to
directors of equity compensation generally represent lower bounds.  I assume no early exercise
of options and no sale of stock compensation, at least for the first five years.  I value options
using the Black-Scholes method.  Volatility and dividend yields for each firm-year are obtained
for the vast majority of observations from the ExecuComp database; when firms are not covered
by ExecuComp, I use the volatility and dividend rate assumptions reported by the company in its
footnote about stock option compensation published in its annual Form 10-K.  I value equity
appreciation through the end of the fiscal year preceding the fifth proxy statement in which the
director appears, using the year-end stock price.
Table 1 presents information about the annual compensation received by outside
directors in the sample.  A little under half of all directors receive stock options and about the
same proportion receive direct stock awards, though a large majority (77 percent) receive at least
one of these two types of equity pay in a given year.  The average retainer from all sources is
worth around $70,000 when awarded, though the data is skewed by some firms making large
annual equity awards worth many hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Additionally, directors
receive an array of lesser compensation in the form of meeting fees, committee fees, insurance
coverage, and other fringe benefits; Perry’s (2000) data indicates that other cash fees increase the
7annual retainer by about one-third.  To keep the data collection and analysis tractable, I ignore
these other types of director compensation, none of which takes the form of equity and therefore
does not appreciate in value over time.
3. Analysis of directors’ incentives
The following sections analyze rewards to outside directors from four sources:
compensation (section 3.1), loss of the board seat if the company performs poorly (section 3.2),
obtaining directorships in other companies if the firm performs well (section 3.3), and the
possibility of an independent director shifting to grey status via the receipt of special payments
or other benefits (section 3.4).
3.1. Compensation
Corporate directors have never received bonuses or other incentive compensation tied to
the success of the firm or their individual performance in the boardroom.  Instead, director
compensation for decades has followed an almost identical structure across firms: a fixed annual
retainer (and smaller additional fees for things such as meeting attendance), which can usually be
deferred in a company-sponsored plan to avoid immediate income taxation.  Retirement or other
pension benefits were once widespread but mostly disappeared in the mid-1990s after
institutional investor protest.  The fixed retainer, which is set by the board or a subcommittee
that deals with compensation or governance issues, has historically tended to exhibit little
variation across firms or industries with anything other than company size.
Since the late 1980s an increasing number of firms have paid the annual retainer in
8equity, using either restricted stock or stock options.  While the value of these fixed awards has
exhibited little relation to firm performance, their subsequent appreciation has had the effect of
tying directors’ rewards much more closely to firm performance than before.  Perry (2000) and
numerous industry surveys document the increasing use of equity in boards’ annual retainers.  In
my sample, the average annual retainer paid to directors was $69,435.  Equity compensation
delivered 62 percent of the total retainer value across the sample, with option awards (40
percent, valued on a Black-Scholes basis) having a more important role than stock awards (22
percent).  Cash compensation made up the remaining 38 percent.  However, these statistics are
somewhat misleading as an indicator of the representative director’s compensation, since the
median option award is zero.
Figure 1 shows that the use of equity compensation has the effect of significantly
increasing outside directors’ ownership stakes as their tenure increases.  Most outside directors
own little or no stock when first elected (by the time of the first ownership report in a proxy
statement, many directors will have been serving on the board for a part-year, so that the
ownership reported may well have come from directors’ fees and not personal investment).  In
my sample, the median director’s fractional ownership in the firm increases by nearly a factor of
12 when measured in the fifth proxy statement following his election compared to the first proxy
statement.  At this point, fifth-year directors own a median $375,000 worth of their firm’s equity,
up from $21,000 at election (a rising stock market over most of the sample period explains why
the dollar value of ownership increases more rapidly than percent ownership).  Mean values for
outside director ownership percent and value (not tabulated) are much higher but are heavily
skewed by a tiny handful of individuals with billion-dollar investments.
1 The maximum remuneration of more than $56 million was received by Michael Miles, former CEO of Philip
Morris, who was elected to the board of Dell Computer in 1995.  Another Dell director elected in the same year did
almost as well.  Dell made large annual stock option awards to outside directors and gave them the opportunity to
exchange their cash retainers for more options, which Miles did, all during a period when its stock soared and split 64:1. 
Miles owned nearly two million options, deep in the money, after his first five years as a director.  Further director option
awards were scaled back by Dell in 1998 “in the best interests of the company and its stockholders.”  Ownership data in
proxy statements indicate that Miles earned tens of millions more from personal investments in Dell stock.
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Table 2 shows the distribution of remuneration for directors over their first five years,
broken into two pieces: the value of fixed retainers when awarded, shown in the first column,
and the subsequent appreciation of stock and option awards, shown in the second column.  All
option values and value changes are calculated using Black-Scholes methodology, assuming that
the options (which generally have ten-year lives) are retained and not exercised by the director
over the first five years.  The table is restricted to the 529 directors who remain on the board at
least through the date of the fifth annual proxy statement after their election.
Data in Table 2 indicate that changes over time in equity award values introduce
considerable variation into the remuneration of outside directors.  Taking both fixed fees and
appreciation into account, the inter-quartile range for director income ranges from $186,000 in
the 25th percentile to $428,000 in the 75th percentile (I do not apply a time value of money
discount factor, which would not change the basic message conveyed by the data).  In the upper
tail of the distribution, outside directors earn extremely high rewards.  Forty-two directors, or
about 8 percent of the sample, received more than $1 million from their retainers over their first
five years’ service, and four directors received more than $20 million.1  Though the most
enriched directors worked for computer and technology firms that arguably benefitted from a
price bubble in the late 1990s, other outside directors among the group of millionaires came from
such diverse firms as General Electric, Costco, Ameritech, Viacom, Target, ConAgra and Gap
10
Stores.
The prospect for new outside directors of some firms to earn millions of dollars in a
relatively short period of years, entirely from their directors’ fees rather than personal
investments, represents a marked change in the pattern of rewards for board service.  Since a
conscientious outside director may spend about 250 hours a year on company business, and
many outside directors serve on three to five boards (and sometimes more), the data imply that
director compensation when a firm succeeds has reached near-parity with the pay of top
executives.
Figure 2 provides insight into the strength of the pay-performance relation for the outside
directors in my sample.  The figure shows mean and median director remuneration over five
years tabulated according to performance decile, with performance measured as the firm’s stock
return minus the CRSP value-weighted market index.  The figure also shows the percentage of
directors in each performance decile who earn more than $1 million over their first five years. 
Since an increasing stock price directly drives appreciation in a director’s stock and option
awards, and since this award appreciation contributes the majority of variation to total
remuneration, a pay-performance relation arises almost mechanically.  Though compensation is
relatively flat across the middle performance deciles, stock returns for firms also do not vary
greatly in this range.  At the upper tails of the performance distribution director compensation
increases markedly.  Moving from the eighth to the ninth and tenth performance deciles, median
five-year director remuneration rises from $338,000 to $468,000 and $718,000, respectively, and
the fraction of directors receiving million-dollar pay increases from 4 percent to 15 percent and
45 percent, respectively.  Put another way, median director remuneration increases by 37 percent
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in the ninth performance decile compared to the eighth, and by an additional 53 percent in the
top decile compared to the ninth.  At the other end of the distribution, median remuneration falls
by 15 percent in the second decile compared to the third, and by an additional 30 percent in the
bottom decile compared to the second (the dollar value changes are not as great as at the top,
since remuneration must be bounded below at zero).
The incentive effects of performance-based remuneration for outside directors represent a
marked change compared to director pay in the 1980s and before.  For comparison purposes, I
use data about directors’ compensation in a sample of 456 Forbes 500 companies with the same
industrial exclusions as the current sample (no financial institutions or electric utilities).  The
data are described more fully in Yermack (1995).  In that sample, which covers the years 1984-
91, stock option awards accounted for 10 percent of the total annual retainer value, compared to
40 percent in the current sample (the unit of observation for that sample is a company-year,
instead of a director-year as done in this paper, so the comparison is not perfect).  Directors fees
in the older sample exhibit a strong association with company size.
Table 3 presents ordinary least squares regressions of the year-over-year change in the
retainer for outside directors (calculated by taking the log of the ratio) against the change in sales
(again calculated as the log of the ratio) and the net-of-market stock return (compounded
continuously).  Stock option awards in both samples are valued using Black-Scholes
methodology.  The regression coefficients in the table can be interpreted as estimated elasticities
of the directors’ retainers with respect to firm size and equity value, respectively.  For the
present sample I use observations beginning with year 2 of each director’s service, since many
firms today give abnormally large equity awards when an outside director first joins a board and
2 Numerous executive compensation studies have estimated this elasticity around .30 for top managers, a
statistic that has remained surprisingly stable over time.  See Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and Murphy (1999).
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such “starter” awards were not included in the comparison sample.  Estimates in Table 3 for the
models’ intercepts indicate that director fees exhibited a secular pattern of 7 to 8 percent annual
increase during the 1980s, a trend that has risen to the range of 9 to 10 percent today.  The
estimated elasticity with respect to firm size previously lay in the range of .10 to .11 but has
surprisingly turned negative in more recent years, in the range of -0.08.2  (Since the model’s
intercept exceeds +.09, a firm that doubles in size would not see its directors’ fees shrink, but
rather grow more slowly over time.)  The estimated elasticity with respect to equity value has
also fallen, from the previous range of .06 to .07 to a new range of .03 to .04.  The regression
estimates suggest two key interpretations.  First, directors’ fees appear largely to have been
unlinked from firm size today compared to the recent past.  Second, the relation between
directors’ fees and equity value, which was never strong in the past, has also grown weaker. 
However, as the previous analysis shows, the increasing use of equity-based retainers today
gives directors strong pay-performance incentives from changes in the awards’ value over time,
an effect not present in the past when retainers were mostly cash-based.
3.2. Company performance and director turnover
Outside director turnover is much lower than turnover for excutives.  I use a binary (0, 1)
variable to measure director turnover and set it equal to 1 for a given year’s observation if a
director does not appear in the next year’s proxy statement.  For firms that are de-listed due to
acquisitions and a few bankruptcies, I set the turnover variable equal to missing for the year of
de-listing.  The turnover variable equals zero for the seven outside directors who become
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insiders during the sample period, though I do not include them in the sample after their last year
as outsiders.  The unconditional rate of director turnover in my sample of directors with five
years service or less is 4.6 percent.
For CEOs and other executives, the threat of replacement represents an important
complement to compensation in the array of incentives that mitigate agency problems.  For
outside directors, the threat of replacement is more attenuated, since directors do not report to a
higher authority who might fire them for poor performance.  Nevertheless, one would expect
directors of under-performing companies to face pressure to leave their posts from institutional
investors or major shareholders.  These directors might also be tempted to abandon the firm in
order to contain damage to their reputations, evade legal liability, and escape the workload
involved in restructuring an under-performing firm.  Under any of these scenarios, if poor
performance of the company leads to departure of the director, he will have lost future income
and the opportunity to increase his reputation as an expert in corporate oversight.
A significant body of research has examined the connection between CEO performance
and turnover, but similar research into outside directors has been scant, generally limited to
extraordinary circumstances such as mergers or bankruptcies.  Gilson (1988) studies turnover of
outside directors in firms that experience financial distress and finds an annualized departure
frequency of 19.5 percent during the distress period.  Harford (2001) finds that the
overwhelming majority of outside directors lose their board seats after a firm is acquired, an
unsurprising result since the firm ceases to exist (a small number will join the board of the
acquirer).  Brown and Maloney (1999) study boards of companies that make acquisition
attempts.  Among the bidders whose offers lead to the lowest announcement stock returns,
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higher turnover of outside directors occurs in advance of the bid, a result that may be consistent
with a more general connection between poor performance and director turnover.
Figure 3a compares cumulative turnover rates for my director sample with the departure
rates for CEOs of the same companies; the chart is constructed by calculating the unconditional
turnover rate for all directors and CEOs in their first years, their second years, and so forth, and
cumulating these average rates geometrically.  While the average age at appointment is 54 for
both outside directors and CEOs, the figure shows that during their first five years in office,
directors leave their positions at a frequency about 60 percent of the departure rate for CEOs. 
Figure 3b compares director and CEO turnover by age and illuminates clear disparities between
the two groups (the figure is not meaningfully different if the sample is restricted to CEOs also
serving in their first five years).  In line with the retirement policies of most U.S. firms, a large
majority of CEOs leave their positions at some point between ages 60 and 69.  However, outside
director turnover in the 60s age range is rare and virtually the same as for directors in their 40s
and 50s.  At age 70 and above, the annual departure frequency is about 20 percent for both
outside directors and CEOs.  (Although not always reported in proxy statements, a significant
number of sample firms report having mandatory retirement ages for outside directors, often at
some age between 70 and 75)
I estimate logistic regressions to evaluate whether a performance-turnover connection
exists for outside directors under general business conditions, a relation not previously studied in
the literature.  I measure performance using the firm’s annual stock return, minus the return for
the CRSP value-weighted index, with both returns compounded continuously before they are
differenced.  I include control variables to account for other factors that might influence director
3 Re-estimating the regressions using an accounting measure of return on assets also leads to negative
coefficient estimates, but they are not generally significant.
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turnover: percent ownership in the firm, years of service, indicator variables for female directors,
grey directors, members of the audit and compensation committees, directors ages 65-69 and 70
and over, and indicator variables for calendar years.
Several papers document a connection between the departure of the CEO and
contemporaneous changes in the board of directors.  See Farrell and Whidbee (2000) and
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988).  To reflect this known link between CEO turnover and director
turnover, I use two indicator variables: (i) an indicator that takes the value of 1 in years in which
the CEO also leaves his position, and (ii) an indicator that equals 1 in all years subsequent to the
departure of the CEO who was in office when the director first joined the board.
Table 4 presents the logit regression estimates and with robust standard errors, which are
used in all remaining regressions to adjust for the possibility that error terms are correlated for
certain subgroups (for instance, the several dozen individuals who appear in the sample more
than once).  Coefficient estimates in Table 4 indicate a negative and significant association
between director turnover and firm performance.3  Similar to the findings of papers studying
CEO turnover, the director performance-turnover effect depends mostly on performance in the
departure year itself, as the coefficient estimate for company performance lagged one year is
near zero.  While the data indicate an association between poor firm performance and departures
of outside directors, one might attribute this pattern to many different motivations.  Director
turnover might be disciplinary in nature, if major shareholders or institutional investors respond
to poor performance by agitating for changes in the board.  Alternatively, directors might
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voluntarily leave poorly performing firms at a high rate, to contain the damage to their
reputations, to limit legal liability, or to avoid the higher workload that boards usually undertake
when performance drops (Vafeas, 1999).  Since the news media rarely reports director departures
and almost never illuminates the reasons for an individual director’s leaving, one cannot easily
partition director turnover into “forced” and “voluntary” sub-samples as many studies do for
CEO turnover.
The estimates also illustrate a close connection between CEO turnover and the departure
of outside directors.  The indicator for years in which the CEO leaves office has a strongly
positive and significant estimate, a prima facie indicator that disciplinary turnover applied to
CEOs might spill over to cause replacements of some outside directors who may be allied with
the executive.  The indicator for the years following the departure of the CEO who had been in
office when the director originally joined the board is similarly positive and significant.  The
latter variable might capture several effects.  The director might lack a personal relationship with
the new CEO that he enjoyed with his predecessor and therefore feel less inclined to continue
serving.  The new CEO may also wish to remake the board with directors of his own choosing,
and tacitly encourage directors appointed by his predecessor to leave.  Notwithstanding the link
between CEO turnover and director turnover, however, director turnover is itself significantly
impacted by poor performance; if the two indicator variables for CEO turnover are omitted from
the regression, the coefficient estimate for the performance variable changes only modestly, from
-0.56 to -0.60.
Several additional control variables in the turnover regressions have interesting estimates
with statistical significance.  As suggested by Figure 3b, directors over age 70 retire at a
4 This result does not extend to an indicator variable for directors who are members of the nominating
committee, which has an estimate very close to zero if included in the model.  I omit this variable because it is missing
for numerous sample companies that have no nominating committee.
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significantly higher rate than other directors.  Female directors exhibit significantly lower
turnover rates than male directors, a result consistent with the well publicized efforts of many
firms to increase the diversity of their boards.  Members of key board committees, especially the
compensation committee, also exhibit less turnover than other directors.4  These directors may
have high value to the board due to their specific knowledge of key areas, and may have
influence in corporate governance that insulates them somewhat from disciplinary turnover.  Re-
estimating the model after including indicator variables for different full-time job occupations
held by the outside directors has virtually no impact on the results, and none of the occupation
indicator variables has a significant estimate.
The statistically significant association between poor company performance and higher
outside director replacement represents a novel finding, but it is less clear that the relation has
sufficient strength to be economically important.  I assess the economic significance of the
performance-turnover relation for outside directors in tests reported in Table 5.  This table uses a
transformation of the logit regression model to estimate the marginal effects upon the probability
of departure of a unit change in key regressor variables; I calculate these marginal effects by
taking the partial derivative of the logit likelihood function and substituting in the regression
coefficient estimates and sample means of each variable.  For comparison purposes, I estimate a
logit turnover model for the CEOs of my sample firms and report its estimated marginal effects
side-by-side with those from the model for outside directors.
Estimates in Table 5 indicate that the performance-turnover relation operates more than
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three times more strongly for CEOs than for outside directors; underperforming the market by
100 percent (in the continuously compounded specification used, this would equal 63 percent
under-performance over the course of a year) is associated with an increase in the probability of
CEO turnover by 7.3 percentage points, and of outside director turnover by 2.2 percentage
points.  Since the standard deviation of the performance variable is about 0.39, these effects
seem modest in economic terms.  However, they are certainly important in relation to the
unconditional frequency of outside director turnover of .046 in the sample; a one standard
deviation decline in the firm’s performance would make the replacement of outside directors
almost one-fifth more likely than otherwise.  If the CEO leaves office during a given year, the
probability of the outside director leaving rises by 3.3 percentage points, and in subsequent years
it remains higher by 2.0 percentage points.  Again, these effects are large compared to the
unconditional outside director turnover rate of 4.6 percent.
To investigate the performance-turnover relation for outside directors in more detail, I
display in Figure 4 the departure rates for directors (again compared with their CEOs) according
to deciles of the stock return performance variable.  Along with the actual departure rates, the
chart shows predicted rates in each decile calculated from logit coefficient estimates from the
model in Table 5.  The chart shows dramatically higher departure rates than expected for both
directors and CEOs in the lowest performance decile, and rates generally close to the predicted
level throughout the rest of the distribution.  The data resemble the actual and predicted decile-
by-decile turnover frequencies reported by Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988, Table 7) in their
study of top management turnover in large firms between 1963 and 1978.  Like that earlier
study, I find a strong concentration of turnover at the very bottom of the performance
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distribution, suggesting that performance must be extremely poor for both the CEO and director
departure probability to increase meaningfully.
Finally, I estimate logit turnover regressions separately for each individual year of 
director service, to see whether the performance-turnover link strengthens or weakens as
directors acquire seniority.  The key coefficient estimate for the stock return performance
variable is strongly negative in years 1 and 2, with estimates of -1.88 (standard error 0.62) and 
-1.43 (0.39), respectively.  After that the coefficient moves close to zero, with no statistical
significance, in years 3, 4, and 5.  For outside directors, therefore, departures linked to poor
performance of the firm appear to occur early in directors’ tenures, if at all.  This finding
contrasts with similar analysis for CEOs of my sample firms, as annual logit turnover regressions
indicate a negative, significant relation between CEO departure and performance at every year of
seniority, with little pattern over time.  Moreover, the strength of the performance-turnover
relation for new outside directors is at rough parity or even stronger than that estimated for new
CEOs.
3.3. Directorships in other firms
Outside directors who develop reputations as skillful monitors might acquire additional
directorships in other firms.  If a new outside director can reasonably expect to serve 10 to 15
years, and if the expected remuneration for a director approaches $100,000 per year (including
meeting fees and fringe benefits), each additional directorship probably has a present value in the
neighborhood of a million dollars, along with the potential for appreciation of equity pay.
A growing literature illustrates that outside directors who oversee their firms
5 Related research studies company performance and the outside directorships obtained by company executives. 
Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that if a firm reduces its dividend, the likelihood falls of its executives gaining additional
directorships.  Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) find a connection between company performance during the CEO’s final
four years in office and the number of directorships he holds after retiring, though the result holds only for accounting
performance and not stock performance.  See also Booth and Deli (1996) and Avery, Chevalier, and Schaefer (1998).
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successfully, or take actions in the interests of shareholders, are more likely to acquire new
directorships.  Most of these papers have focused on the change in directors’ other board seats in
the aftermath of some extraordinary situation or event, rather than the general performance of the
firm.  See Gilson (1988) (financial distress); Farrell and Whidbee (2000) (dismissal of CEO);
Harford (2001) (sale of the firm); Coles and Hoi (2001) (opting out of anti-takeover legislation).5
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2002) come closest to studying whether the overall
performance of a company affects the number of board seats by its outside directors.  The
authors find a positive association between performance and directors obtaining new board seats. 
However, a number of aspects of the authors’ research design limits the applicability of the
results.  For outside directors who are not retired, performance is measured with respect to the
director’s primary employer, rather than for the firm in their sample on whose board he serves. 
For directors who do not have full-time jobs, performance is measured as an average across all
companies on whose boards they sit, rather than for the sample firm.  The authors measure
performance only by accounting profitability rather than stock market returns.  Finally, their
regressions for the acquisition of directorships rely on a (0, 1) binary dependent variable that
equals 1 if any new directorships are obtained; this specification takes account of neither the
number of additional directorships received, nor the possibility that directors could lose rather
than gain external board seats (this truncation of the dependent variable appears in several of the
other studies cited above).
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Figure 5 tabulates the distribution of the change in other board seats held by the outside
directors who serve for the entire five-year period of my sample.  The chart, which is limited to
directorships held in public companies, shows that a (0, 1) binary variable measuring the change
in directorships does not do justice to the richness of the data; directors gain as many as five
other board seats over the sample period, and a substantial number experience a net loss in board
seats.  The distribution has a mean change of +0.20 directorships (standard deviation 1.28) and a
median of 0.
I regress the four-year change in board seats against the company’s net-of-market stock
returns during the director’s tenure in office.  I include indicator control variables for various
director occupations, grey status, and gender.  I include as a variable the company’s rank in the
Fortune 500, in the belief that appointment to the boards of the most visible public firms will by
itself bring reputational benefits that increase with the prominence of the company.  I also add to
the model the number of other board seats already held by the director.  One would expect new
board seats to have a mechanical negative association with this variable, since directors serving
on zero boards could only gain seats, while those serving on very many boards are likely to
refuse new seats beyond a certain point.  Table 6 reports the regression estimates.  The current
year stock return refers to the fiscal year ended prior to publication of the fifth proxy statement
in which the director appears, i.e., the director’s fourth year of service.  I find that more than one
year’s lag of the performance model does not contribute to the model, so I do not report
historical stock returns beyond two years.
Estimates in Table 6 show a positive association between the company’s performance in
the previous two years and the net acquisition of new board seats by outside directors over the
22
four years since their appointments.  However, only the lagged performance variable has a
significant estimate.  If a smaller time period is used to measure the acquisition of directorships,
such as the change over the director’s first two or three years on the board instead of four years, I
do not obtain significant results, suggesting that the market for directors’ services takes time to
assess and assimilate the monitoring ability of newly appointed directors.  Using accounting
profits instead of stock returns as the measure of performance also leads to positive estimates,
but they are not significant.  Grey directors receive fewer new board seats than independent
ones, a result indicating that firms are reluctant to recruit directors who have exhibited conflicts
of interest on other boards.
Given the stock performance variable’s standard deviation of 0.39, the coefficient
estimates for this variable and its lag suggest that one standard deviation out-performance of the
market for two years will lead to an expected increase of about 0.2 directorships for each outside
director, a relation that appears to have some economic significance as well as statistical
significance, given the potential remuneration described earlier.
While the analysis indicates a positive association between firm performance and the
opportunities for outside directors to serve on other boards, the change in directorships held is a
somewhat imperfect measure of any director’s reputation.  On occasion directors may lose board
seats by taking actions in shareholders’ interest, such as agreeing to sell the firm or openly
challenging the policies of ineffective managers.  The raw number of board seats held may also
become negatively associated with a director’s monitoring capacity beyond a certain point, since
directors sitting on very many boards may become inattentive or susceptible to cronyism.
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3.4. Special treatment of outside directors
Some outside directors may obtain special benefits from their service, such as personal
consulting contracts with the corporation or a stream of business for their main employers. 
Others may enter into interlocking relationships with the CEO, obtaining mutual benefits by
sitting on one another’s boards or sitting together on a third board.  The prospect of joining a
board as an independent outside director and subsequently entering into one of these “grey”
relationships may provide a form of incentive.
The possibility of independent directors becoming “corrupted” into grey status over time
is suggested by data reported in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), tabulated for the same sample
used in this paper.  The overall composition of the boards in the sample includes 25.8 percent
grey directors, but only 10.6 percent of newly appointed directors have grey status.  The
disparity between these numbers could be explained by some combination of three effects: (i)
grey directors serving longer tenures than independent directors; (ii) fewer grey appointments in
recent years than in the past, or (iii) a pattern of “corruption” in which independent directors
acquire conflicts of interest and become grey over time.  Possibility (i), that grey directors might
serve for longer tenures than independent directors, is not supported by the data.  The
unconditional turnover frequency of grey directors is higher than for independents, and
regression estimates in Table 4 indicate a higher turnover probability for greys as well (though
the difference from independents is not statistically significant).
Data also do not support the hypothesis that independent directors might be
systematically corrupted into grey status over time.  Over the five years studied in the sample, I
find 30 independent directors (5 percent of the sample) acquiring grey status at some point, the
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large majority through the creation of interlocks with the CEO.  However, these changes are
almost exactly offset by 26 grey directors in the original sample losing their conflicts of interest
and becoming independent, most often when the CEO with whom the grey director was
interlocked retires while the director remains on the board.  Special consulting contracts or other
personal benefits for outside directors are rare in the sample, as only 1.6 percent have them
disclosed in proxy statements in any given year.
An interesting question is whether shareholders might predict which independent
directors are most likely to move to grey status over time.  I define a (0, 1) “corruption” indicator
variable that equals 1 if an independent appointee becomes grey at any point over their first five
years on the board.  I regress this variable in a probit model against percent ownership, indicator
variables for the director’s main occupation, the number of other boards on which the director
sits, gender, age, indicators for committee membership, and the abnormal stock return that
occurred when the director’s appointment was originally announced.  Among the occupational
indicators, attorneys who join the board as independent directors exhibit a significant higher
probability of turning grey; the result does not extend to other professional service providers
such as investment bankers or consultants.  Directors who sit on a large number of boards also
are more likely to become grey, probably because they have a greater possibility for future
interlocks with the CEO.  Female directors are less likely than males to move from independent
to grey status, though the result has borderline statistical significance.  The abnormal stock
return at the director’s appointment has no association with the future probability of becoming
grey.
I conclude that the prospect of extraordinary personal benefits plays little meaningful role
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as an incentive for outside directors.  The explanation for the disparity between the recent rate of
grey outside director appointments and the much higher cross-sectional average of grey outsiders
already serving on boards appears to be due to a much reduced tendency to appoint grey
directors now compared to the past.
4. Conclusions
In the past, few outside directors expected to become wealthy as a result of their board
service.  My investigation of outside directors appointed to Fortune 500 boards between 1994
and 1996 indicates that directors today receive much more lucrative compensation incentives
than before.  Most outside directors now receive a significant portion of their annual retainers in
either stock or stock options.  Changes over time in the value of these equity awards introduce
considerable variation into director remuneration.  A clear pay-performance relation exists for
outside directors, with 45 percent of board members of companies in the top performance decile
earning more than a million dollars in their first five years of board service, and significant
differences in remuneration emerging at both ends of the performance spectrum.
I also find evidence that outside directors experience meaningful performance incentives
from both the possibility of replacement and the attraction of new board seats in other firms. 
Both of these variables have significant relations with overall firm performance, under general
business conditions and not just extreme circumstances such as financial distress or removal of
the CEO.
Collectively these results suggest that directors’ incentives to increase the value of the
firm have strengthened considerably in recent years, validating the efforts of institutional
26
investors to introduce reforms in director selection, evaluation, and compensation.
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Figure 1
Ownership of outside directors
Quartiles of the distribution of ownership for a sample of 734 outside directors elected to boards
of Fortune 500 companies between 1994 and 1996.  Ownership for each director is calculated as
shares held divided by shares outstanding.  All data are obtained from company proxy
statements, with share holdings measured according to the SEC’s definition of beneficial
ownership.  Data are tabulated separately for each of the director’s first five years in office.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Median ownership (%) 0.0004% 0.0015% 0.0027% 0.0036% 0.0047%
Median ownership
($000)
$21 $72 $154 $263 $375
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Figure 2
Five-year value of compensation for outside directors,
including appreciation of equity awards
Value of retainers received in their first five years of service for 527 outside directors of Fortune
500 companies elected between 1994 and 1996.  The calculation includes the value of annual
retainers paid in cash, stock, and stock options, as well as the subsequent appreciation of option
and share awards.  All option values, including appreciation, are computed using the Black-
Scholes method.  Data are tabulated in five-year performance deciles, with performance
measured as the firm’s cumulative stock return minus the CRSP value-weighted index.
D
ecile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean (000) $180 $225 $282 $277 $273 $398 $440 $554 $560 $4,380
Median (000)  $145 $207 $243 $246 $254 $347 $338 $338 $468 $718
Obs. above $1m 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 9% 4% 15% 45%
Mean annual stock
return, net of market
-43% -20% -15% -11% -7% -4% -1% 2% 7% 20%
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Figures 3a and 3b
Retirement rates of outside directors and CEOs
Retirement frequencies for a sample of 734 outside directors appointed to the boards of Fortune
500 companies between 1994 and 1996, compared with retirement rates for the CEOs of the
same companies.  Turnover is tabulated cumulatively by years in office and by age.  Turnover
due to acquisition or de-listing of the firm is excluded.
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Figure 4
Retirement rates of outside directors and CEOs, by performance decile
Retirement frequencies for outside directors appointed to the boards of Fortune 500 companies
between 1994 and 1996, compared with retirement rates for the CEOs of the same companies. 
Data are collected for the first five years in office of each director.  The chart shows departure
probabilities tabulated within performance deciles, with performance measured as the firm’s
annual stock return minus the return on the CRSP value-weighted index.  Actual departure rates
for directors and CEOs in each performance decile are compared with values predicted by the
logit regressions shown in Table 5.  Turnover due to acquisition or de-listing of the firm is
excluded.
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Figure 5
Change in board seats held by outside directors
Change in the number of directorships held in other public companies for a sample of 529
outside directors elected to the boards of Fortune 500 companies between 1994 and 1996.  The
change is calculated over a four-year period from information disclosed in company proxy
statements.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for key variables in a sample of 734 outside directors elected to the boards
of Fortune 500 companies between 1994 and 1996.  Data is obtained from company proxy
statements.  Grey directors have disclosed conflicts of interest with the firm or its officers.  Stock
ownership is measured according to the SEC’s definition of beneficial ownership.  Stock option
values are calculated using the Black-Scholes method.
Outside directors in sample 734
Remaining in sample in fifth year 529 72%
Retire before fifth year 114 16%
Firm is delisted before fifth year 84 11%
Become inside directors before fifth year 7 1%
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Age at election 54.0 7.4 30 54 75
Female 0.205
Grey 0.163
Shares held / outstanding first year 0.0079 0.0788 0 0.000004 0.8808
fifth year 0.0052 0.0653 0 0.000047 0.8680
Stock ownership (000) first year $8,572 $84,696 $0 $21 $1,606,588
fifth year $8,481 $156,149 $0 $375 $3,583,060
Other board seats held first year 2.04 1.89 0 2 14
fifth year 2.27 1.73 0 2 9
Audit committee member first year 0.254
fifth year 0.529
Compensation cmte. member first year 0.158
fifth year 0.453
Cash retainer (000) $26.3 $10.8 0 $25.0 $85.0
non-zero 0.958
Stock retainer (000) $15.5 $33.8 0 0 $474.5
non-zero 0.480
Stock option retainer (000) $27.8 $87.2 0 0 $1,364.9
non-zero 0.440
Table 2
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Distribution of fees received by outside directors in first five years
Descriptive statistics for the distribution of retainer fees received by outside directors elected to
the boards of Fortune 500 companies between 1994 and 1996.  Data is tabulated only for the
sub-sample of 529 directors who remain in office at the date of the fifth proxy statement released
after their election.  The first column reports the aggregate fixed retainer fees received during the
first five years of service by each director, including cash, restricted stock awards, and stock
options, which are valued according to the Black-Scholes method.  The second column shows
the appreciation of stock option and restricted stock awards from the award year until the end of
the fifth year, with option value changes calculated according to Black-Scholes.  Equity awards
are assumed to occur at the average monthly closing stock price during the award year.  The
table does not include further remuneration received by directors, including meeting fees,
committee fees, retirement benefits, insurance, and matching charitable contributions.  All dollar
values are in thousands.
Sum of
Annual
Retainers
Change in Value of
Options and
Stock Awards
Total
Received
Minimum $47 ($381) $47
5th percentile $131 ($127) $122
10th percentile $158 ($77) $143
25th percentile $198 ($10) $186
Median $261 $17 $286
75th percentile $375 $101 $428
90th percentile $570 $304 $782
95th percentile $723 $775 $1,351
Maximum $3,438 $53,956 $56,707
Mean $347 $412 $760
Standard deviation $341 $3,549 $3,771
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Table 3
Determinants of growth in director fees
Ordinary least squares estimates of the annual percentage change in directors’ annual retainers
against the annual percentage change in sales and the company’s stock return, net of the CRSP
value-weighted index.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity appear in parentheses below
each coefficient estimate.  The left three columns use observations from a sample of Forbes 500
companies between 1984 and 1991.  The right three columns use data from the current paper’s
sample, which covers outside directors elected to boards of Fortune 500 companies between
1994 and 1996 and follows them for their first five years in office.  I exclude the first year of the
1994-2000 sample because directors often receive large equity awards when joining boards. 
Both samples exclude firms in the financial and electric utility industries.  Directors’ retainers
include fixed cash compensation, stock awards, and stock option awards.  Option awards are
valued according to the Black-Scholes approach.
1984-1991 sample 1994-2000 sample
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept 0.070 *** 0.080 *** 0.072 *** 0.093 *** 0.093 *** 0.099 ***
(11.14) (11.98) (11.25) (10.89) (10.58) (10.81)
Sales growth 0.118 ** 0.100 ** -0.082 ** -0.089 **
(2.36) (2.00) (2.29) (2.43)
Stock return, 0.073 ** 0.060 * 0.033 ** 0.038 **
net of market (2.07) (1.70) (1.98) (2.32)
Observations 2,838 2,838 2,838 1,636 1,636 1,636
R2 0.0039 0.0034 0.0061 0.0032 0.0018 0.0056
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
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Table 4
Regression models of outside director turnover
Logistic regression estimates of the turnover probability for outside directors.  The sample includes 734
outside directors elected to the boards of Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 1996 and includes the first five
years in office for each director.  Turnover due to acquisition or other de-listing of the firm is excluded.  The
grey director indicator variable equals 1 if the director has a disclosed conflict of interest with the company or
its officers.  The indicator for appointing CEO no longer in office equals 1 in years following the departure of
the CEO who appointed the director to the board.  The stock return variable equals the firm's raw return for
the fiscal year, minus the CRSP value-weighted index return, both compounded continuously  Standard errors
shown in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Estimate Estimate
Intercept -2.11
(0.73)
*** -2.12
(0.73)
***
Years of service -0.12
(0.13)
-0.12
(0.13)
Age 65 to 69 indicator 0.04
(0.29)
0.04
(0.29)
Age 70 and over indicator 1.79
(0.38)
*** 1.78
(0.38)
***
Percent ownership 0.31
(0.87)
0.24
(0.93)
Grey 0.33
(0.22)
0.33
(0.22)
Female -0.77
(0.30)
*** -0.77
(0.30)
***
Member of audit committee -0.29
(0.19)
-0.29
(0.19)
Member of compensation committee -0.50
(0.22)
** -0.50
(0.22)
**
CEO departure year 0.86
(0.22)
*** 0.85
(0.22)
***
Appointing CEO no longer in office 0.59
(0.23)
*** 0.59
(0.23)
***
Stock return, net of market -0.56
(0.24)
** -0.56
(0.24)
**
Stock return, net of market (prior year) -0.07
(0.24)
Year indicator variables
Sample size
Yes
3,025
Yes
3,025
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
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Table 5
Outside director turnover compared to CEO turnover
Marginal effects of a unit change in various explanatory variables upon the probability of
departure for outside directors and CEOs.  Statistics are calculated using a logistic
regression model, substituting coefficient estimates and sample means of each variable
into the partial derivative of the likelihood function.  Variable definitions and the
description of the outside director sample are the same as in Table 4.  Statistical
significance is based on regression standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
Outside
Directors CEOs
Years of service -0.001 0.003 ***
Age 65 to 69 indicator 0.000 0.208 ***
Age 70 and over indicator 0.064 *** 0.046
Female -0.030 *** 0.105
CEO departure year 0.033 ***
Appointing CEO no longer in office 0.020 **
Stock return, net of market -0.022 *** -0.073 ***
Sample size 3,062 3,062
Unconditional departure frequency 0.046 0.138
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
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Table 6
Additional board seats obtained by outside directors
Ordinary least squares estimates of the number of board seats acquired by outside directors
during their first four years of service on the boards of Fortune 500 companies.  The sample
includes 529 directors elected to company boards between 1994 and 1996, who continue to
serve as directors of the same companies four years later.  Information about board seats is
limited to other public companies and is collected from director biographies published in the
first and fifth annual proxy statements in which a director appears.  Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity appear in parentheses.
Estimate
Intercept 1.08
(0.31)
***
Grey -0.25
(0.15)
 *
Female -0.19
(0.12)
Number of other board seats held when elected -0.30
(0.03)
***
Company rank in Fortune 500 -0.0005
(0.0003)
Stock return, net of market 0.12
(0.12)
Stock return, net of market, lagged one year 0.34
(0.15)
**
Occupation indicator variables Yes
Sample size 3,062
R2 0.23
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
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